



## 1 SCOPE

This document details the application of SOP 202 issued by the Electricity Association.

## 2 ISSUE RECORD

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Issue Date	Issue No	Author	Amendment Details
October 2000	1	Esther Stewart	Initial Issue in New Format: 3 Page Document

## 3 ISSUE AUTHORITY

Author	Owner	Issue Authority
Esther Stewart	Roger Bracey	Roger Bracey Group Head, Standards .....



#### 4 SOP DETAILS

**TYPE:** GEC-A (AEI) 300 (275)kV Air Blast CB TYPE GA10  
and

145 (132)kV GA6 in **OUTDOOR** substations.

**ORIGINATING REC:** NGC

**DATE:** 27/04/98

**NO. INSTALLED IN MANWEB:.** 7 (Located at Carrington)

**NO. INSTALLED IN SCOTLAND:**

**STATUS:** Restriction.

The following restriction shall apply to all **outdoor** substations containing live switchgear of the above type

- (1) Access to the substation compound shall be restricted to short periods for essential operational purposes only. Short duration access or "passing through" to gain access to non restricted areas is acceptable with no further precautions taken.
- (2) Where access is required for essential operational work for periods in excess of 30 minutes, a risk assessment will be undertaken and the necessary protective measures taken to ensure staff safety. (Advice available from standards section).
- (3) Each site will be surveyed by Regions with guidance from Standards section to check for proximity to public places, schools, play areas etc. Where such proximity exists special arrangements will be agreed with Standards designed to safeguard the public in the event of equipment failure.
- (4) When a leak test is carried out on the CB Blast Tubes and proved to be negative the restriction may be removed.

In addition warning notices will be provided at each entry point of the Substation compound to advise "Restricted Area. Refer To Control"

#### **REASON:**

An NGC risk assessment has identified a risk of catastrophic failure associated with defective seals on the GEC-A (AEI) ABCB type GA10 W8. A resultant high risk to personnel has been established within 50m of GA10 W8 CB's during and for a short time after rain / snow conditions when free water ingress across defective seals is possible.



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**UPDATE:**

**REMEDIAL ACTION:**

All **outdoor** GA6 and GA10 Switchgear to be taken out of service at the earliest opportunity and subjected to a leak test on the Blast Tubes to prove the security of the seals in the conditioning air system. New seals to be fitted to defective units as appropriate before the CB's are returned to service and the restriction removed.