Network Output Measures (NOMS): Assumptions Log SP Transmission plc DRAFT Date: 30th April 2018

No	Section	Parameter Affected	Assumption	Assumption Effective Date	Assumption Review Date	Plan to Reduce or Eliminate
1	End of Life Modifier	EOL Mod and PaE surve	Unknown failure modes will not manifest often enough to render the model too inaccurate for use.	30/04/2018	n/a	Poving during collipstion, testing, and validation
3	End of Life Modifier	Factor Values	Factor Values set to a default value (normally 1, to have no multiplacative impact) in the absence of data.	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during calibration, testing, and validation.
4	End of Life Modifier	Factor Values	Individual Factor Values are independent of each other. Assets will behave in a manner consistent with their history, making predicting future behaviour possible by examining past	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during calibration, testing, and validation.
6	End of Life Modifier	All Assets	Family/Type issues can be represented via a single value (Generic	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during calibration testing and validation
7	End of Life Modifier	All assets	Reliability) EOL modifier can accurately be represented (up to a value of 5.5) by area and LSE factors when actual condition information is not	30/04/2018	21/08/2018	Peview during calibration, testing and validation
		All 6	available. It is assumed that routine maintenance and inspections are carried	20/04/2018	21/08/2010	
8 9	End of Life Modifier	All non-lead Assets	out. It is assumed that modelling the risk of a lead asset sensibly	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during calibration, testing, and validation.
10	End of Life Modifier	All EOL modifiers	aggregates the risks posed by supporting non-read assets. The age of an asset is given by current year-installation year. Where installation year is uncertain an estimate of the likely year is	30/04/2018	n/a	
11	End of Life Modifier	Data input	determined from available data. It is assumed historical data being put in (eg old DGA results) are	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during calibration, testing, and validation.
12	End of Life Modifier	Cables	accurate. Duty data not currently collected. Current EOL mod values thus	30/04/2018	n/a	Investigating ability to collect.
13	End of Life Modifier		assumed to be accurate without. Conductor sampling results can be represented by a single value	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during calibration testing and validation
14	End of Life Modifier	Circuit Reaker	(Conductor Sample HI). SF6 condition can be accurately represented via a single score (Gas	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during calibration testing and validation
15	End of Life Modifier	Circuit Beaker	Condition Factor) SF6 leakage only impacts EOL modifier at values above 20kg.	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Values are currently subject to ongoing review.
16 17	CBRM	Averge Life value PoF	Assumed value: assets are very rarely run to failure Asset failures are independent of other assets	30/04/2018 30/04/2018	ongoing n/a	
18	CBRM	PoF	Failure modes are independent of other asses	30/04/2018	n/a	
19	CBRM	PoF	Assets can be grouped into similar categories that share similar charactistics	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	expected events
20	CBRM	PoF	Failure modes can be grouped into categories of similar impact.	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during calibration, testing, and validation.
21	CBRM	PoF	Asset groups are independent of each other. It is assumed that interventions, when carried out, are carried out	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review whether any interventions have been found to have failed
22	CBRM	PoF	fully and successfully. The probability of each failure mode occurring can be represented	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	to improve asset life expectancy.
23	CBRM	PoF	via a single value.	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during calibration, testing, and validation.
24	CBRM	PoF	operating conditions (eg a circuit breaker interruptor failure will only manifest itself as a failure when the circuit breaker attempts to break current).	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during testing, validation and calibration process
25	System Consequence	x	Methodology only considers the loss of customers who are disconnected by the least number of circuits which includes the asset in question (X=Xmin)	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Areas where it is suspected that this assumption leads to significant error could be examined and the customer disconnection events considered be extended beyond X=Xmin
26	System Consequence	M _N	The equation for M_N assumes that the quantity and importance of customers lost at each site within the lost area are equal	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Example areas could be tested with explicit calculation of all loss events vs the method used to test validity of assumption
27	System Consequence	P	Both potential values of P_i assume that circuit capacities are designed to SQSS requirements with no additional spare capacity	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	potentially modify the values of P ₁ to take into account any average spare capacity
28	System Consequence	P _{oc}	The probability of disconnection is independent of the duration of asset unavailability due to the failure mode. It is assumed that if customer disconnection does not occur at the inception of the fault, it will not occur later.	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	P_{f} could be modified to include a term that involves D_{f}
29	System Consequence	P _{oc}	The probability of disconnection is independent of the health of assets neighbouring the asset in question. Often neighbouring assets will be of similar condition and health to the asset in question	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	P_f could be modified to include a term that involves the health of the asset
30	System Consequence	D	Disconnection duration is calculated by the minimum of all the mean restoration times of the events that have lead to the disconnection. The restoration time will in reality be of a function that is a composite of all the individual event restoration time function:	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Data could be gathered to construct the individual event restoration times. The probabilisitic function for minimum restoration could then be created and the mean of that function taken
31	System Consequence	VOLL	VOLL is assumed to be constant across GB except where Vital	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	If more research on locational VOLL was available then this data
32	System Consequence	Cn	It is assumed that the boundary transfer impact of each circuit that is material to a boundary is comparable.	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	If boundary impacts of each circuit were calculated by the SO the costs could be scaled accordingly
33	System Consequence	Cn	It is assumed that asset failures are equally likely accorss the year	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	If data on the seasonality of a failure mode and the seasonality of boundary costs were available then each season could be treated
34	System Consequence	P _Y	The probability of coincident faults is independent of the health of assets neighbouring the asset in question. Often neighbouring assets will be of similar condition and health to the asset in question	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	P_{γ} could be modified to include a term that involves the health of the asset
35	System Consequence	R _{RC}	It is assumed that alternative voltage support can be obtained through the ancillary services when compensation assets are unavailable. In reality this is sometimes not the case.	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	If research on the cost impacts of overvoltage on TOs and customers were available these could be included in the model
36	System Consequence	R _{RC}	It is assumed that the full capacity of a compensation asset is ourchased when it is unavailable	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	If the SO could provide data on the relationship between asset availability and SO costs this could be incorporated
37	System Consequence	C _{MVArh}	It is assumed that the cost to procure MVArh across the network is	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	If the SO could provide locational cost data this could be
38	Safety Consequence	Probability of injury	The probability of injury is assessed on a per person basis, i.e. one	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during testing, validation and calibration process
39	Safety Consequence	Probability of injury	Probabilities assume an individual within the vicinity of the asset when event occurs. The vicinity of an asset is 50m as described in	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during testing, validation and calibration process
40	Safety Consequence	Civil Fines	TGN 227 Mean value used for civil damage results; enough information from reference book to normally distribute fines	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during testing, validation and calibration process
41	Safety Consequence	Probability of injury	Probability values based on expert opinion.	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review and refine during testing, validation and calibration process
42	Safety Consequence	Probability of injury	For probability of injury for a category 4 - possibility of fatality event. Use calculations from a high pressure bushing disruptive failure, Full text in Knock C, Horsfall I, and Champion S.M (2013). <i>Development of a computer model to prefict risks from an</i> <i>electrical bushing failure</i> . Elsevier. This includes a spreadsheet of research carried out by Cranfield University, analysing the probability of fatality, being lacerated/penetrated by shrapnel with permanent injury (Major), and being lacerated/penetrated by shrapnel with no sustained injury (LT). The analysis averaged (mean) their values across the different 'zone's for a vertical bushing, which related to the areas around a bushing le directly in front, to the side etc., and averaging (mean) their values for a person at 15m_25m_35m_45m_and 55m.	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during testing, validation and calibration process
43	Safety Consequence Environment	Probability of injury Probability of environmental	Probability of injury attributed to maximum injury sustained	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during testing, validation and calibration process
44	Consequence	impact	Expert opinion used to create values	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during testing, validation and calibration process
45	Consequence	impact	occurred	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during testing, validation and calibration process
46	Environment Consequence	Probability of environmental impact	category 3 based on CB failures - majority of gas CB failures have resulted in category 1 (major) SF6 loss	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	
47	Environment Consequence	Probability of environmental impact	All CB probabilities of environmental impact based on gas CBs	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	

48	Environment Consequence	Probability of environmental impact	All cable probabilities of environmental impact based on oil-filled cables	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	
49	Financial	Cost of intervention	Financial cost of intervention including replacement is based on an averaged value determined for each asset.	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during testing, validation and calibration process
50	Financial	Cost of intervention	The cost value is not flexed based on underlying specifications of the asset or the location of the asset.	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during testing, validation and calibration process
51	Target Setting	Circuit Breaker EOL modifier	Current age=installation year-report year	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during testing, validation and calibration process
52	Target Setting	All PoF	2010 EOL modifier to PoF mapping function parameters are the same as 2016	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	Review during testing, validation and calibration process
53	Target Setting	Interventions - All Assets	Applying NLR replacement dates from the NOMs submission in the reporting year	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	
54	Uncertainty	Confidence Interval	Estimating the CI of MC trials of a single risk methodolgy (as defined in the document) is sufficient to generate reliable estimates of uncertainty.	30/04/2018	31/08/2018	As part of testing, validation and calibration alternative formulations for generating Risk maybe developed and the spread of results across many methods used to assess the level of uncertainty.